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action against an executor to recover money alleged loaned to decedent, plaintiff introduced testimony of a third party regarding a conversation between

RECENT DECISIONS

plaintiff and decedent in which decedent said, "I owe you five hundred and
twenty dollars and you will get every cent of it." Plaintiff then testified,
over objection, as to the circumstances and terms of the alleged loan. The
transaction was oral, and there was no other evidence relating to the circumstances or terms of the loan. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed, assigning as error the overruling of his objection to plaintiff's competency
as a witness under the Montana "dead man's act." 1 Held, affirmed. The
Montana statute permits the court, in its discretion, to admit such testimony,
and in this case sufficient foundation was laid 2 to make the admission of the
testimony proper. Ahlquist v. Pinski, (Mont. 1947) 185 P. (2d) 499·
At common law, it was an established rule that a person interested in the
outcome of litigation was not a competent witness on his own behalf.3 This
rule was vigorously. criticized, and beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century, legislation was adopted in all jurisdictions abolishing incompetency for interest.4 A statutory exception has been deemed necessary, however,
in practically all jurisdictions, disqualifying the survivor of a transaction with
a decedent from testifying as to that transaction against the latter's estate or
representative. 5 Since the statutes imposing this disqualification vary in their
provisions and in the language employed, it is impossible to derive any general
rules from the cases interpreting them, although several problems are common
to most of the statutes. For example, Who is an "interested party"? What is
a "transaction" or "communication"? Who is entitled to the protection of the
statute? May the disqualification be waived? The cases are so numerous, and
rest, for the most part, on such minor technicalities that an attempt to reyiew
and reconcile them would serve no useful purpose. However, some tendencies
may be found. Several courts, questioning the desirability of the disqualifying
statutes, interpret them so as to limit their scope as much as possible.6 Most of
the statutes expressly provide that the protection to the decedent's representative
is waived if he introduces testimony or other evidenc~ of the transaction favorable to the estate.7 In some states, even in ·the absence of express statutory provision, the courts hold that the protection is waived when such evidence is
introduced by the decedent's representative. 8 The general statutory rule disMont. Code (1935) § 10535-3.
In Pincus v. Davis, 95 Mont. 375, 26 P. (2d) 986 (1933), the court had
ruled that the trial court should not admit the testimony of such a witness unless a
foundation had been laid by other evidence, sufficient to warrant the court's exercise
of its discretion. This requirement is not found in the statute.
3
An excellent historical discussion of disqualification for interest may be found in
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 674 et seq. (1940).
4
2 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 693 (1940).
5
The applicable statutes for all common law jurisdictions are set forth verbatim
in 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 525 et seq. (1940). The same protection is often
extended to guardians or other representatives of insane or incompetent persons.
6
See, for example, St. John v. Lofland, 5 N.D. 140, 64 N.W. 930 (1895);
Goehring v. Dillard, 145 Ohio St. 41, 60 N.E. (2d) 704 (1945).
7
See Ala. Code ( l 940) tit. 7, § 4 33 ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. 100, § I 20;
S.C. Code ( l 942) § 692.
8
Rock v. Gannon Grocery Co., 246 Mich. 545, 224 N.W. 752 (1929);
Kinley v. Largent, 187 Cal. 71, 200 P. 937 (1921).
1
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qualifying a survivor as a witness has been widely criticized.9 The critics
contend that justice is more often defeated by excluding the only available
proof of a claim than it would be by fraudulent claims if such testimony were
admitted. They contend that the inherent honesty of most people, coupled
with the weapon of cross-examination and the vigilance of trial judges, is sufficient protection to decedent's estates. As yet, however, there has been no
widespread modification of the rule.10 Three distinct departures from the
general rule have been tried with apparent success.11 In New Mexico,12 the
interested survivor of a transaction is not barred from testifying, but a judgment
in his favor may not be given upon his uncorroborated testimony. In Connecticut 18 and Oregon,14 the interested survivor may testify, but if he does, any
writings, memoranda, or declarations made by the decedent may be introduced
to rebut such testimony. Virginia 15 combines these features, providing that the
survivor,s testimony must be corroborated to support a judgment in his favor,
and permitting memoranda and statements of the decedent to be introduced.
Three states, New Hampshire,1 6 Arizona,17 and Montanta,18 employ the usual
statutory disqualification, but add the proviso that if, in the discretion of the
court, it appears that the survivor's testimony is necessary to prevent injustice,
it may be admitted, with alleged abuses of discretion subject to appellate review.
In the principal case, it is evident that the Montana statute gave the trial court
adequate authority to rule as it did in admitting plaintiff's testimony.

George A. Rinker, S.Ed.
9 I

GREENLEAF, EvIDENcE, 16th ed., 493 (1899); 2 _WIGMORE, EvmENcE,
3d ed., 697 (1940); St. John v. Lofland, 5 N.D. 140, 64 N.W. 930 (1895). See
also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MoDEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE, comment b to Rule IOI
(1942).
10
Several concrete proposals have been made for alteration or abolition of the
rule. See the report of MORGAN, et al. (Commonwealth Fund Committee), THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE: SoME PROPOSALS FOR hs REFORM 35 (1927), and AMERICAN
LAw INSTITUTE, MoDEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE, Rule IOI (1942).
11
But see 46 HARv. L. REV. 834 (1933), where it is pointed out that the
operation of the' most liberal statutes has been greatly restricted by judicial interpretation.
12
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 20-205.
18
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 5608.
14
Ore. Comp. Laws (1940) § 3-103.
15
Va. Code Ann. (1942) § 6209.
18
N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 392, §§ 25, 26.
17
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 23-105.
18
Mont. Code (1935) § 10535.

